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Abstract We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal pref-
erences over m objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the pref-
erences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL
method to compute an envy-free assignment for two agents. The AL method crucially
depends on the assumption that agents have strict preferences over objects. We gen-
eralize the AL method to the case where agents may express indifferences and prove
the axiomatic properties satisfied by the algorithm. As a result of the generalization,
we also get a O(m) speedup on previous algorithms to check whether a complete
envy-free assignment exists or not. Finally, we show that unless P=NP, there can be
no polynomial-time extension of GAL to the case of arbitrary number of agents.
Keywords Fair division · envy-freeness · Pareto optimality · AL method
JEL Classification: C70 · D61 · D71
1 Introduction
Fair allocation of resources is one of the most critical issues for society. A ba-
sic, yet widely applicable, problem in computer science and economics is to allo-
cate discrete objects to agents given the ordinal preferences of the agents over the
objects. The setting is referred to as the assignment problem or the house allo-
cation problem (see, e.g., Abraham et al., 2005; Aziz et al., 2014a; Bouveret et al.,
2010; Brams and Kaplan, 2004; Brams et al., 2003; Brams and Fishburn, 2000;
Brams et al., 2012; Demko and Hill, 1988; Ga¨rdenfors, 1973; Manlove, 2013;
Wilson, 1977; Young, 1995). In this setting, there is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n},
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a set of objects O = {o1, . . . , om} with each agent i ∈ N expressing ordinal prefer-
ences %i over O. Each object is assumed to be acceptable to the agents. The goal is
to allocate the objects among the agents in a fair or optimal manner without allow-
ing transfer of money. The model is applicable to many resource allocation or fair
division settings where the objects may be public houses, school seats, course en-
rolments, kidneys for transplant, car park spaces, chores, joint assets of a divorcing
couple, or time slots in schedules.
For the assignment problem, the case of two agents is especially central. Many
disputes are between two parties and may require division of common resources.
Divorce proceedings is one of the settings in which common assets need to be divided
among the two parties. Other examples in history include partition of countries which
results in the need to divide common assets.
When objects are allocated among agents, it is desirable that they are allocated in
a fair and efficient manner. For fairness, one of the most established concepts is envy-
freeness. A formal study of envy-freeness in microeconomics can be traced back to
the work of Foley (1967). Envy-freeness requires that each agent should prefer its
allocation over other agents’ allocations. Envy-freeness can be trivially satisfied by
not giving any objects to any agents. However, if we insist that the assignment should
be complete, i.e., it allocated all the objects to the agents, no assignment may be envy-
free as is the case in which there is only one object and the agent who does not get
any object is envious. The most established notion of efficiency is Pareto optimality
which requires that there should be no other allocation which each agent weakly
prefers and at least one agent strictly prefers. Pareto optimality has been termed the
“single most important tool of normative economic analysis” (Moulin, 2003). An
assignment which gives no objects to agents is clearly not Pareto optimal.
In view of the importance of the two-agent setting, and the fundamental goals
of envy-freeness and Pareto optimality, Brams et al. (2014a) presented an elegant al-
gorithm called AL for the case of two agents that computes a maximal assignment
that is envy-free as well as locally Pareto optimal (Pareto optimal for the set of al-
located objects).1 Since there may not exist a Pareto optimal and envy-free assign-
ment, Brams et al. (2014a) relax the requirement of Pareto optimality to local Pareto
optimality. The algorithm has received attention in the literature (see e.g., Brams,
2014a,b; Bouveret et al., 2015; Dickerson et al., 2014; Procaccia and Wang, 2014).
The desirable aspect of AL is that is returns a locally Pareto optimal and a max-
imal envy-free assignment. By maximal, we mean that unallocated objects cannot
be additionally given to the agents’ partial allocations without compromising envy-
freeness. Brams et al. (2014a) also claim that AL returns a complete envy-free as-
signment if there exists a complete envy-free assignment. One possible limitation of
the AL method is that it assumes that agents have strict preferences over objects. We
present a generalization of the AL method in which agents may express indifferences
among agents.
Indifferences in preferences are not only a natural relaxation but are also a prac-
tical reality in many cases. For example, if there are multiple copies of the same
1 The notion of envy-freeness that they use is equivalent to SD (stochastic dominance) envy-
freeness (Aziz et al., 2014a) and necessary envy-freeness (Bouveret et al., 2010).
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object with the same characteristics, then an agent is invariably indifferent among
all such copies. Indifferences can lead to various challenges. The complexity of so-
lution concepts in the presence of indifferences can be considerably more than in
the case of strict preferences. A famous example is that of roommate markets for
which the problem of finding a stable matching is polynomial-time solvable for strict
preferences but NP-complete for weak orders (Ronn, 1990). Similarly, a number of
fairness concepts are harder to compute when weak orders are allowed (Aziz et al.,
2014a). In view of this, effort has been taken to generalize algorithms and rules
for the case of indifferences in voting (see e.g., Aziz et al., 2013a; Cullinan et al.,
2014), housing markets (see e.g., Aziz and de Keijzer, 2012; Saban and Sethuraman,
2013), coalition formation (Aziz et al., 2013b), and various matching market mod-
els (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008; Manlove, 2013; Scott, 2005). The main contribution
of this paper is a generalization of AL which we refer to as GAL for the case in which
agents may express indifferences. The main result of the paper is as follows.
Theorem 1 For two agents, GAL returns in time O(m2) a maximal envy-free and
locally Pareto optimal assignment even if agents express weak preferences. If a com-
plete envy-free assignment exists, GAL computes a complete envy-free assignment.
Moreover, there exists no other assignment that Pareto dominates it and is still envy-
free.
Previously, Bouveret et al. (2010) and Aziz et al. (2014a) presented O(m3) time
algorithms to check whether a complete envy-free assignment for two agents exists or
not. The algorithms require solving network flow or maximum matching problems.
As a corollary of GAL, we obtain a simple O(m2) algorithm to check whether there
exists a complete assignment that is EF.
The critical reader may ask whether GAL can be generalized to handle an ar-
bitrary number of agents. We show that unless complexity classes P and NP co-
incide (Fortnow, 2013), there exists no polynomial-time algorithm for an arbitrary
number of agents that satisfies the same properties as GAL.
2 Related work
Computation of fair discrete assignments has been intensely studied in the last
decade. In many of the papers considered, agents express cardinal utilities for
the objects and the goal is to compute fair assignments (see e.g., Lipton et al.,
2004; Procaccia and Wang, 2014). We consider the setting in which agents
only express ordinal preferences over objects (Aziz et al., 2014a; Bouveret et al.,
2010; Brams and Kaplan, 2004; Brams et al., 2003; Brams and Fishburn, 2000;
Pruhs and Woeginger, 2012) which are less demanding to elicit.
When agents express preferences over objects and we need to reason about pref-
erences over allocations, there are different ways one can define envy-freeness such
as possible envy-freeness and weak SD envy-freeness (Aziz et al., 2014a). In this pa-
per we will use the strongest known reasonable notion of envy-freeness. The notion is
equivalent to necessary envy-freeness in (Bouveret et al., 2010), SD-envy-freeness in
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(Aziz et al., 2014a), EF notion used in (Brams et al., 2014a) and pair-wise envy-
freeness in (Brams et al., 2014b). We will refer to the notion simply as EF just
like Brams et al. (2014a) do. Aziz et al. (2014a) and Bouveret et al. (2010) presented
O(m3) algorithms to check whether there exists an EF assignment. We show that
there exists a simple O(m2) algorithm for the problem even if agents express weak
preferences.
There are other papers (Aziz, 2014; Chevaleyre et al., 2006; de Keijzer et al.,
2009) in fair division in which agents explicitly express ordinal preferences over
sets of objects rather than simply expressing preferences over objects (Aziz, 2014;
Chevaleyre et al., 2006; de Keijzer et al., 2009). For these more expressive mod-
els, the computational complexity of computing fair assignments is either even
higher (Chevaleyre et al., 2006; de Keijzer et al., 2009) or representing preferences
requires exponential space (Aziz, 2014; Brams et al., 2012). In this paper, we restrict
agents to simply express ordinal preferences over objects.
3 Preliminaries
An assignment problem is a triple (N,O,%) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents,
O = {o1, . . . , om} is a set of objects, and the preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) spec-
ifies for each agent i its preference %i over O. Agents may be indifferent among
objects. We will denote by ≻i the strict part and by ∼i the indifference part of the
relation %i. We denote %i: E1i , . . . , E
ki
i for each agent i with equivalence classes in
decreasing order of preferences. Thus, each set E ji is a maximal equivalence class
of objects among which agent i is indifferent, and ki is the number of equivalence
classes of agent i. If an equivalence class is a singleton {o}, we list the object o in the
list without the curly brackets. A preference profile consists of dichotomous prefer-
ences each agent has at most two equivalence classes. A preference profile consists
of strict preferences each agent has strict preferences over the objects.
Definition 1 (Assignment) An assignment p = (p(1), . . . , p(n)) specifies the alloca-
tion of objects p(i) to each i ∈ N such that p(i) ⊆ O and p(i) ∩ p( j) = ∅ for all i , j.
An assignment is complete if o ∈ ⋃i∈N p(i) for all o ∈ O.
We define the SD (stochastic dominance) relation. An agent SD-prefers one allo-
cation over another if for each object, the former allocation gives the agent as much
probability of getting at least preferred an object as the latter allocation.
Definition 2 (SD (stochastic dominance)) Given two assignments p and q, p(i) %S Di
q(i), i.e., agent i SD prefers allocation p(i) to allocation q(i) if for each o ∈ O,
∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ q(i)
∣∣∣ .
Agent i strictly SD prefers p(i) to q(i): p(i) ≻S Di q(i) if p(i) %S Di q(i) and ¬[q(i) %S Di
p(i)].
Although each agent i expresses ordinal preferences over objects, he could have
a private cardinal utility ui consistent with %i: ui(o) ≥ ui(o′) if and only if o %i o′.
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Definition 3 (SD-efficiency) An assignment p is SD-efficient if there exists no other
assignment q such that q(i) %S Di p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻S Di p(i) for some i ∈ N.
SD-efficiency is equivalent to Pareto optimality for discrete assignments as defined
by (Brams et al., 2014a). Hence we will refer to SD-efficiency as Pareto optimality
and SD-domination as Pareto domination.
Definition 4 (Locally Pareto optimal) An assignment p is is LPO (locally Pareto
optimal) if there exists no other assignment q such that ⋃i∈N p(i) =
⋃
i∈N q(i) and
q(i) %S Di p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻S Di p(i) for some i ∈ N.
Definition 5 (SD envy-freeness) An assignment p satisfies SD envy-freeness or is
SD envy-free if each agent SD prefers its allocation to that of any other agent:
p(i) %S Di p( j) for all i, j ∈ N.
From the definition it is easy to see that a necessary condition for SD envy-freeness
is that each agent gets the same number of objects.
Brams et al. (2014a) defined EF as follows.2
Definition 6 (EF (envy-freeness)) An allocation p is EF (envy-free) if for all i, j ∈
N |p(i)| = |p( j)| and there exists an injection fi j : p(i) → p( j) and an injection
f ji : p( j) → p(i) such that for each object o ∈ p(i), i (weakly) prefers o to fi j(o) and
for each object o ∈ p( j), j (weakly) prefers o to f ji(o).
Then, by using a similar argument as (Lemma 1, Brams et al., 2014a), we can
show that EF is equivalent to SD envy-freeness. We detail the argument for the sake
of completeness and to formally extend Lemma 1(Brams et al., 2014a) to the case of
indifferences.
Lemma 1 EF is equivalent to SD envy-freeness.
Proof We first show that EF implies SD envy-freeness. Suppose p satisfies EF and
take any object o ∈ O. Suppose that there is an object o′ ∈ p(i) such that fi(o′) %i o.
By the definition of fi, we know that o′ %i fi(o′). Since fi(o′) %i o, we get that
o′ %i fi(o′) %i o. Hence,
∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(−i)
∣∣∣ .
We now show that SD envy-freeness implies EF. Suppose that assignment p does
not satisfy EF with the EF condition violated for agent i. Consider a bipartite graph
G = (p(−i) ∪ p(i), E) where {o, o′} ∈ E if o ∈ p(−i), o′ ∈ p(i), and o′ %i o. Since
p does not satisfy EF for i, G does not admit a perfect matching. By Hall’s theorem,
there exists set O′ ⊆ p(−i) such that |N(O′)| < |O′| where N is the neighbourhood
of O′ in the graph G. Consider an object o ∈ min%i (O′). Since, |N(O′)| < |O′|, this it
implies that ∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(−i)
∣∣∣ .
But then p does not satisfy SD envy-freeness. ⊓⊔
2 We use the same definition as in (Brams et al., 2014a) except that we use weakly prefers rather than
strictly prefers since we are considering weak preferences.
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Lemma 2 If the number agents is constant, it can be checked in O(m) time whether
a given assignment is EF or not.
Proof We show that it can be checked in O(m) time whether a given assignment for a
constant number agents is SD envy-free or not. We first show that an SD comparison
between any two allocations can be made in O(m) time. Let us say that we want to
check whether p(i) %S Di p(−i) where −i is some agent other than i. Without loss of
generality, assume that i’s preferences are a coarsening of linear order o1, . . . , om.
– We construct in O(m) a vector x(p(i)) = (x1, . . . , xm) where xi = 1 if oi ∈ p(i)
and xi = 0 otherwise. Using x(p(i)) we construct in O(ki) time a vector s′(p(i)) =
(s′1, . . . , s′ki ) where s′j = |{E
j
i } ∩ p(i)|. Using s′(p(i)) we construct in O(ki) time a
vector s(p(i)) = (s1, . . . , ski ) where s j =
∑ j
ℓ=1 s
′
j.
– In a similar way, we construct in O(m) a vector y(p(−i)) = (y1, . . . , ym) where
yi = 1 if oi ∈ p(−i) and xi = 0 otherwise. Using y(p(i)) we construct in O(ki)
time a vector t′(p(−i)) = (t′1, . . . , t′ki ) where t j = |{E
j
i } ∩ p(−i)|. Using t′(p(−i)) we
construct in O(ki) time a vector t(p(i)) = (t1, . . . , tki ) where t j =
∑ j
ℓ=1 t
′
ℓ
.
Now p(i) %S Di p(−i) iff s j ≥ t j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}. This again takes time O(ki).
Hence an SD comparison between allocation takes time O(m) + 4O(ki) = O(m).
In order to test EF, we need to make n(n − 1) comparisons which is constant if
n is constant. Hence testing EF of an assignment for constant number of agent takes
time O(m). ⊓⊔
If the number of agents is not constant, then the time complexity is O(n2m). In
the paper, we will assume that n = 2 i.e., there are two agents. If we refer to some
agent as i ∈ {1, 2}, then we will refer to the other agent as −i. Even for more than two
agents, we may refer to −i as some agent other than i ∈ N.
Finally, define maximal envy-freeness.
Definition 7 (Maximally envy-free assignment) We say that a partial assignment p
is maximally envy-free if it is envy-free and there exists no assignment q such that
q(i) ⊇ p(i) for all i ∈ N, q(i) ⊃ p(i) for some i ∈ N, and q is envy-free.
4 GAL — Generalized AL
Before we delve into GAL, we first informally describe a simplified version of AL
that still satisfies the properties of AL as described in (Brams et al., 2014a). Agents
have strict preferences and in each round they pick one object each. The algorithm
repeats the following until all objects have been allocated to agent 1, 2, or contested
pile C. We will refer to an object as unallocated if it has not been allocated to 1 or
2 or placed in C. If the most preferred unallocated object of the agents is not the
same, each agent picks its most preferred object. Otherwise, if the most preferred
unallocated object o coincides, then we check whether we can give it to agent 1. If o
is given to agent 1 and the next most preferred unallocated object is given to agent 2
and the partial assignment satisfies EF, then we allow such an allocation in the round.
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If not, we check in the same way whether we can give it to agent 2.3 If o cannot be
given to either of the two, we put it in C.
The general idea of GAL is as follows. Since the preferences of the two agents are
weak orders, we first construct unique linear orders called priority orders based on the
preferences. Although, the comparisons to check the feasibility of EF assignments are
still done with respect to the original preferences, the constructed linear orders help
identify which unique object should each agent try to get first. The priority orders are
refinements of the preferences where, if an agent is indifferent between two objects,
it has higher priority for the object less preferred by the other agent. If both agents
are indifferent among two objects, then agent 1 has higher priority for the object
with the lower index and agent 2 has higher priority for the object with the higher
index. After suitably constructing the linear orders, >1 and >2, agents try to take
the highest priority. If agents have a different highest priority object, they take their
highest priority objects. Otherwise there is a conflict so we must try to give one of the
agents the highest priority object and give the other agent the second highest priority
object according to the priority list if it does not violate EF.4 If this cannot be done,
we send the contested object to C, the so called contested pile. A key idea behind
GAL is that if an object o∗ is sent to the contested pile, then it cannot be the case that
o∗ along with some subsequent less preferred objects are allocated to agents and EF
is not violated. The algorithm is formally defined as Algorithm 1. Note there is an
asymmetry in the algorithm in that agent one is considered first to get object o∗ in
Step 18. One can consider any of the two agents first or even toss a coin to select one
agent. The properties of the algorithm are not affected.
First observe that for strict preferences, GAL is equivalent to the simplified AL
method. The reason is that for strict preferences, there exists a unique priority order
irrespective of any lexicographical tie-breaking order. We present a couple of exam-
ples to illustrate how GAL works. The contested pile is empty in one example and
non-empty in another.
Example 1
%1: {o1, o2, o3}, {o4, o5, o6}
%2: {o2, o3, o4}, {o6}, {o1, o5}
>1: o1, o2, o3, o5, o6, o4
>2: o4, o3, o2, o6, o5, o1
(i) Round 1: p(1) = {o1}, p(2) = {o4}, C = ∅;
(ii) Round 2: p(1) = {o1, o2}, p(2) = {o4, o3}, C = ∅;
(iii) Round 3: p(1) = {o1, o2, o5}, p(2) = {o4, o3, o6}, C = ∅.
3 This feasibility check is phrased in a different way in the original description of AL but is equivalent
to checking for EF.
4 The view of EF as being defined with respect to the SD relation makes it easy to argue for a maximal
EF assignment.
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Algorithm 1 GAL — algorithm for envy-free assignment of indivisible objects to
two agents
Input: ((%1 ,%2),O)
Output: EF assignment p
1 Construct a linear order >1 for agent 1: for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, oi >1 o j if oi ≻1 o j; o j >1 oi if oi ≻2 o j
and oi ∼1 o j; oi >1 o j if oi ∼2 o j and oi ∼1 o j and i < j
2 Construct the linear order >2 for agent 2: for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, oi >2 o j if oi ≻2 o j; o j >2 oi if
oi ≻1 o j and oi ∼2 o j; o j >2 oi if oi ∼2 o j and oi ∼1 o j and i < j.
3 O′ ←− O
4 p(1) ←− ∅; p(2) ←− ∅
5 C ←− ∅
6 round number t ←− 0
7 while O′ , ∅ do
8 t ←− t + 1
9 if |O′ | = 1 then
10 C ←− C ∪ O′
11 else if max>1 (O′) , max>2 (O′) then
12 p(1) ←− p(1) ∪ max>1 (O′)
13 p(2) ←− p(2) ∪ max>2 (O′)
14 O′ ←− O′ \ {max>1 (O′),max>2 (O′)}
15 else if max>1 (O′) = max>2 (O′) then
16 o∗ ←− max>1 (O′) (or max>2 (O′))
17 O′ ←− O′ \ {o∗}
18 if (p(1) ∪ {o∗}, p(2) ∪ {max>2 (O′)}) is EF w.r.t % then
19 p(1) ←− p(1) ∪ {o∗}
20 p(2) ←− p(2) ∪ {max>2 (O′)}
21 O′ ←− O′ \ {max>2 (O′)}
22 else if (p(1) ∪ {max>1 (O′)}, p(2) ∪ {o∗}) is EF w.r.t % then
23 p(2) ←− p(2) ∪ {o∗}
24 p(1) ←− p(1) ∪ {max>1 (O′)}
25 O′ ←− O′ \ {{max>1 (O′)}
26 else
27 C ←− C ∪ {o∗}
28 end if
29 end if
30 end while
31 return (p(1), p(2))
Example 2
%1: {o7}, {o1, o2, o3}, {o4, o5, o6}
%2: {o7}, {o1}, {o3}, {o4, o5}, {o2, o6}
>1: o7, o2, o3, o1, o6, o4, o5
>2: o7, o1, o3, o5, o4, o6, o2
(i) Round 1: p(1) = ∅, p(2) = ∅, C = {o7};
(ii) Round 2: p(1) = {o2}, p(2) = {o1}, C = {o7};
(iii) Round 3: p(1) = {o2, o3}, p(2) = {o1, o5}, C = {o7};
(iv) Round 4: p(1) = {o2, o3, o4}, p(2) = {o1, o5, o6}, C = {o7}.
Proposition 1 GAL runs in O(m2) time and is deterministic.
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Proof In each round, either one object each is allocated to the agents or one contested
object is sent to C. If each agent has a different highest priority unallocated object,
then the allocation takes constant time. Otherwise, the agents have the same highest
priority contested object o∗. In this case, we need to make at most two checks for
whether there exists an EF partial assignment that allocated o∗ to one of the agents. In
either of these checks, we simply need to verify whether the given partial assignment
is EF or not which takes time O(m) according to Lemma 2. Thus, GAL takes time
O(m2). ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 GAL returns a maximal EF assignment.
Proof The GAL outcome is EF. This follows from the way the partial assignments
are constructed so that EF is maintained. If max>1 (O′) = max>2 (O′), then the partial
assignment is only modified after checking that the modification still satisfies EF.
If max>1 (O′) , max>1 (O′), then each agent is given a most preferred unallocated
object from O′. Since the partial allocation p is EF, and for each o ∈ p(i), o %i
max>i (O′) %i max>−i (O′), it follows that the allocation which gives p(i)∪{max>i(O′)}
to each i ∈ {1, 2} is EF.
We now show that the outcome is a maximal EF assignment. Assume for contra-
diction that GAL’s outcome p is not maximal EF. This means that for some object
o ∈ C there exists an assignment q that matches the objects matched by p as well as
o and possible other objects. Consider the object o that is the first object to be placed
in the contested pile C and consider the stage in Algorithm 1 where o was sent to
C. If o was given to agent −i, then agent i was given the next highest priority object
o′ according to >i which still leads to infeasibility of EF. Clearly o ≻i o′ or else the
partial assignment p at the stage wouldn’t fail EF. For every other unallocated object
o′′ in O′ (that has not in the contested pile) at that stage, it holds that o′ %i o′′. Hence
no object o′′ can be given to agent i while o is given to −i so that p is still EF. By
the same argument, every subsequent object that is placed in C cannot be allocated to
one of the agents without causing the other agent to be envious. ⊓⊔
Next, we show that if there exists a complete EF assignment, then GAL returns
a complete EF assignment.5 For the proposition, we require the following lemma
which follows from (Theorem 4(i), Aziz et al., 2014b).
Lemma 3 For the case of two agents, any partial assignment p if EF iff for each
o ∈ p(i) ∪ p(−i),
|p(i) ∩ {o′ : o′ %i o}| ≥ |{o′ ∈ p(i) ∪ p(−i) : o′ %i o}|/2.
Proposition 3 If there exists a complete EF assignment, then GAL returns a complete
EF assignment.
Proof Assume for contradiction that there exists a complete EF assignment but GAL
does not return a complete EF assignment. Then there exists at least one object in the
5 The argument in Theorem 3 of Brams et al. (2014a) only shows that for strict preferences, AL finds
maximally EF assignment. It does not show that for strict preferences, AL efficiently computes a complete
EF assignment if a complete EF assignment exists.
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contested pile. Let us consider the first object o that is placed in the contested pile.
When o is placed in the contested pile, let the partial EF allocation be p. Let the next
priority available unallocated objects of i and −i be oi and o−i respectively where it
could be possible that oi = o−i. Since o is placed in the contested pile, this means
that the assignment which gives p(i) ∪ {o} to i allocation and p(−i) ∪ {o−i} is not EF.
Similarly, the assignment which gives p(i)∪ {oi} to i allocation and p(−i)∪ {o} is not
EF. This implies that o ≻i oi and o ≻−i oi. Let the rank o in agent i’s priority list
be ri(o) and the rank o in agent i’s list be r−i(o). Now consider the objects in p(i).
All objects in p(i) are have a better rank than o for agent i. Secondly, in agent i’s
priority list, if an object is not allocated to i, it is allocated to agent −i. Now agent i’s
allocation p(i) is such that if o is given agent −i and oi to agent i, the assignment is
not EF. By Lemma 3, this means that |p(i)| < |{o′ ∈ p(i) ∪ p(−i) : o′ %i o}|/2. The
assignment which allocates o in addition one of the agents in addition to the partial
assignment p if not EF even if agent i got his |p(i)|most preferred objects. This means
that there does not exist a complete EF assignment. ⊓⊔
Next we show that the GAL outcome is LPO. Unlike in (Brams et al., 2014a), we
cannot use the characterization of Brams and King (2005) that if agents have strict
preferences, any assignment as a result of sequential allocation is Pareto optimal.
Hence we need a lemma.
Let (N,O,%) be an assignment problem and p be a discrete assignment. We will
create an auxiliary assignment problem and assignment where each agent is allocated
exactly one object (see e.g., Aziz et al., 2014b). The clones of an agent i ∈ N are
the agents in N′i = {io : o ∈ O and o ∈ p(i)}. The cloned assignment problem of
(N,O,%) is (N′,O,%′) such that N′ = ⋃i∈N N′i . and for each io ∈ N′, %′io=%i. The
cloned assignment of p is the discrete assignment p′ in which o ∈ p′(io) if o ∈ p(i)
and o < p′(io) otherwise. A cloned assignment can easily be transformed back into
the original assignment where each agent i ∈ N is allocated all the objects assigned
by p′ to the clones of i.
Lemma 4 An assignment for two agents is LPO iff there exist no objects o, o′ such
that o is allocated to i, o′ is allocated to −i, o′ ≻i o and o %−i o′.
Proof By (Lemma 2, Aziz et al., 2014b), an assignment is Pareto optimal if and only
if its cloned assignment is Pareto optimal for the cloned assignment problem. Hence,
we can restrict our attention to the cloned assignment and the cloned assignment set-
ting. If the cloned assignment is Pareto optimal, the original assignment is Pareto opti-
mal. If the cloned assignment is not Pareto optimal, then there exists a ‘trading cycle’
in which each object points to its owner, each cloned agent in the cycle points to an
object that is at least as preferred as its own object and at least one agent in the cycle
points to a strictly more preferred object than the one it owns (Aziz and de Keijzer,
2012).
Firstly, we claim that there exists no trading cycle consisting only of clones of
one agent. Assume for contradiction that there exist a trading cycle consisting of only
of clones of the same agent. Then there exists at least one object that is minimally
preferred. The agent who points to this object also owns a minimally preferred object.
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Hence each agent owns a minimally preferred object and thus the cycle is not Pareto
improving.
We now show that, if there exists a trading cycle, then there exists one which alter-
nates between clones of the two agents. Consider any cycle which has the following
path consisting of multiple clones of the same agent in succession:
oc1 → ic1 → oc2 → ic2 · · · → ock → ick → ock+1−ick+1 .
Since clones of each agent i have the identical preference, ic1 also points directly to
ock+1 . Hence, we know that there is also a path
oc1 → ic1 → ock+1 → −ick+1 .
We now show that if there exists a trading cycle which alternates between clones
of the two agents, then there exists one with exactly one clone of each agent. By
the definition of trading cycle, at least one agent points to a strictly more preferred
over the object he owns. Assume that a clone of agent i gets a strictly more preferred
object in the trading cycle. Let such a clone be i j that points to o∗. Consider the clone
i1 of agent i who has the least preferred object among all clones of i. We can assume
without loss of generality that i1 points to a strictly more preferred object that the one
he owns. If this were not the case, then we know that i j has a trading path to i1 and
i1 also strictly prefers o∗ over the object he owns. This means that there is trading
cycle in which i1 points to a strictly more preferred object owned by a clone of −i.
Hence, without loss of generality let the agents in the trading cycle have the following
sequence where i1 points to and strictly prefers the object of −i1 over his own object:
i1,−i1, i2,−i2, . . . , ik,−ik, i1.
If clone i2 is indifferent between his object and the object owned by i1, then this
means he strictly prefers −i1’s object over his own object. But this means that i2 and
−i1 weakly prefer each other’s objects over their own object and i2 strictly prefers
−i1’s object which means we have already shown that there exist o, o′ such that o is
allocated to i, o′ is allocated to −i, o′ ≻i o and o %−i o′. Suppose for contradiction
that i2 has a strictly more preferred object than the object owned by i1. Since i1 has
the least preferred object among all clones of i, it points to any object that i2 points to.
Since i2 points to the object of −i2, this means that i1 strictly prefers the object of −i2
over his own object. By the same argument, i1 strictly prefers each object owned by
the clones of −i in the trading cycle. Since at least one clone of −i points to the object
of i1, we have shown that there exist o, o′ such that o is allocated to i, o′ is allocated
to −i, o′ ≻i o and o %−i o′.
We use Lemma 4 to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The GAL outcome is LPO.
Proof Let us constrain ourselves to the set of objects O′ ⊆ O that are allocated to
agents 1 and 2. Now let (N′,O′,%′) be the cloned assignment problem. Then assign-
ment p for objects in O′ is PO iff the corresponding assignment is PO for (N′,O′,%′).
Now assume that the GAL outcome is not LPO. Then the assignment with respect to
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O′ is not PO. By Lemma 4, there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that i gets o in some round t,
o′ ≻i o where o′ was allocated to −i and o %−i o′. This means that o′ was allocated
to i in round t′ ≤ t. Now if o ≻−i o′, then o would be a higher priority object for −i
so that it would not have gone for o′ before o. Then it must be that o ∼−i o′. But, if
o ∼−i o
′
, then o would again be a higher priority object for −i so that it would not
have gone for o′ before o. Hence a contradiction. ⊓⊔
In Proposition 4, we showed that there exists no other (not necessarily EF) as-
signment that uses the same objects as the GAL outcome and is Pareto improvement
over the GAL outcome. Next we show that there exists no other EF assignment that
may use any objects and is a Pareto improvement over the GAL outcome.
Proposition 5 GAL returns an assignment such that there exists no other assignment
that Pareto dominates it and is envy-free.
Proof Assume for contradiction that GAL’s outcome p is SD-dominated by another
EF assignment q such that q(i) %S Di p(i) for both i and q(i) ≻S Di p(i) for at least
one i. We now proceed in rounds where in each round we check the highest priority
allocated object of each of the two agents that have not been checked. We check
the partial assignments pt and qt in each round t to see whether qt(i) ≻S Di pt(i).
Let us assume that qt(i) ≻S Di pt(i) and qt(−i) %S D−i pt(−i) for the smallest possible
t . If both qt(i) ≻S Di pt(i) and qt(−i) ≻S D−i pt(−i), then it means that in q both get
higher priority objects than p in that round. This is a contradiction as GAL would
allocated these higher priority objects to the agents. Now assume that qt(i) ≻S Di pt(i)
and qt(−i) ∼S D
−i p
t(−i). This means that agent −i gets an equally preferred object
and the other agent i gets a higher priority object. But this is again a contradiction,
because GAL would have allocated the more preferred object to i in that round. ⊓⊔
Note that for the case of two agents, Aziz et al. (2014a) presented a polynomial
time algorithm to check whether a complete SD-envy-free assignment exists or not.
In order to compute a maximal SD envy-free assignment, one can consider different
subsets O′ ⊂ O and check whether a complete SD-envy-free assignment exists or
not for O′. However this approach would require checking exponential number of
subsets.
We have already shown that GAL satisfies the desirable properties of AL on a
more general domain. Next, we show that under strict preferences GAL returns an
assignment that is a possible outcome of AL. In this sense, GAL is a ‘proper’ gener-
alization of AL.
Proposition 6 For strict preferences, GAL returns an AL outcome.
Proof For strict preferences, there exists a unique priority order irrespective of any
lexicographical tie-breaking order. We show that under strict preferences, GAL and
AL handle all the cases in an equivalent manner.
Let us compare the formal definition of AL (Page 133-134 Brams et al., 2014a)
with the pseudocode of GAL. In AL, in stage t, the direction “If one unallocated item
remains, place it in CP and stop” is equivalent to Steps 9 and 10 of Algorithm 1.
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In AL, in stage t, the direction “If no unallocated items remain, stop.” is equivalent
to the stopping condition in the while loop of Algorithm 1.
If both agents have different most preferred (equivalent to highest priority since
the preferences are strict) unallocated objects, then both GAL and AL behave in the
same manner and give the most preferred objects to the agents. For AL this direction
is specified in the last sentence of the stage t 1).
Finally, both algorithms have a check for when both agents have the same most
preferred objects with this check being in step t 2) in the specification of the AL
method. In AL, the most preferred available contested object i is tentatively given to
the one of the agents. In the specification of Algorithm 1, the most preferred available
object is also tentatively given to one of the agents. Since, in Algorithm 1, this object
is referred to as o∗ so we will refer it as o∗ for both algorithms. Let us say agent
who gets it is agent −i. The other agent i is tentatively given the next most preferred
object that is not yet allocated. In the description of AL, i could be given an even less
preferred unallocated object but in at least one instantiations of AL, i is tentatively
given the next most preferred object that is still available. According to AL, such
a tentative assignment is feasible as long as the number of objects assigned to −i
including o∗ or put in the contested pile (“unassigned”) that i prefers to the next most
preferred unallocated object is at most t. This means that for the tentative assignment
p, |{o′ ∈ p(i) : o′ ≻i o∗}| ≥ |{o′ ∈ p(i) ∪ p(−i) : o′ ≻i o∗}|/2. Since agent i’s allocation
from the previous round consists of objects strictly preferred over o∗, this means that
i is not envious of −i in p as long as i was not envious of −i in the previous round.
Thus in both algorithms, the tentative assignment in which the contested object is
given to agent −i and the next most preferred unallocated object is given to agent i is
made permanent if the modification does not cause envy. Hence the feasibility check
in the case of AL is equivalent to checking whether the tentative new assignment is
EF. If the tentative assignment is not EF for o∗ given to either of the two agents, then
GAL puts o∗ in the contested pile. Similarly, AL puts the object in the contested pile
(Step t 5)). ⊓⊔
5 Discussion
In this paper, we presented GAL that is a generalization of the AL method of
Brams et al. (2014a) for the fair allocation of indivisible objects among two agents.
A crucial advantage of extending AL to GAL is for the case in which agents have
identical preferences. If agents have strict and identical preferences, then AL assigns
all the objects to the contested pile. However if the preferences are really coarse, such
as when all objects are equally preferred, then GAL assigns ⌊m/2⌋ to each agent.
GAL can also be used as an algorithm to solve previously studied problems within
fair division:
Theorem 2 There exists a O(m2) algorithm to check whether there exists a complete
assignment that is EF.
Proof By Proposition 3, if there exists a complete EF assignment, GAL returns such
an assignment. ⊓⊔
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Previous algorithms to solve this problem take time O(m3) and require solving
network flow or maximum matching problems (Bouveret et al., 2010; Aziz et al.,
2014a).
GAL is specifically designed for the case of two agents. This raises the question
whether GAL can be generalized to the case of arbitrary number of agents.
Theorem 3 Assume there exists an algorithm A that returns a maximal envy-free
assignment that is complete if a complete envy-free assignment exists. Then A does
not take polynomial time assuming P , NP.
Proof Bouveret et al. (2010) proved that checking whether there exists a complete
EF assignment is NP-complete for strict preferences. Aziz et al. (2014a) proved that
checking whether there exists a complete EF assignment is NP-complete for dichoto-
mous preferences. If A is polynomial-time, then it can be used to compute a maximal
EF assignment. If the assignment is complete, we know that there exists a complete
EF assignment. If the assignment is not complete, we know by Proposition 3 that
there does not exist a complete EF assignment. Hence a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute a maximal EF assignment can solve an NP-complete problem in polyno-
mial time. ⊓⊔
GAL can also be seen as a discrete version of the probabilistic serial (PS) al-
gorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Katta and Sethuraman, 2006) that is used
to compute a fractional assignment. PS is SD-efficient and SD-envy-free. In other
words, PS returns a maximal fractional assignment that is both SD-efficient and SD-
envy-free. In the randomized setting, there is always a complete assignment that sat-
isfies both properties. Similarly, a GAL outcome is a maximal discrete assignment
that is both SD-efficient and SD-envy-free. If we restrict ourselves to discrete assign-
ments, then there may not exist a complete and envy-free assignment.
In this paper, we assumed that all objects are acceptable. The case where some
objects may be unacceptable to an agent can be handled. If an object is unacceptable
to both agents, it can be discarded from the outset. If an object is only acceptable to
one agent, it will only be given to that agent.
It will be interesting to apply the approach of maximal EF to weaker notions
of fairness (Aziz et al., 2014a; Bouveret et al., 2010). Finally, extending GAL to the
case of constant number of agents is left as future work.
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